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BLOGGING WHILE (PUBLICLY) EMPLOYED:
SOME FIRST AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS
Paul M. Secunda*
I. INTRODUCTION
While private-sector employees do not have First Amendment' free
speech protection for their blogging activities relating to the workplace,2
public employees may enjoy some measure of protection depending on the
nature of their blogging activity. The essential difference between private-
sector and public employment stems from the presence of state action in the
public employment context.3 Although a government employee does not
have the same protection from governmental speech infringement as
citizens do under the First Amendment,4 a long line of cases under
Pickering v. Board of Education5 have established a modicum of protection,
. Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. The author continues
to blog at Workplace Prof Blog on labor and employment law developments and issues,
though he is no longer publicly employed. See Workplace Prof Blog, http://lawprofessors.
typepad.com/laborprof blog.
1 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech.").
2 There is some evidence that many private-sector employees mistakenly believe that
they have First Amendment speech protection for blogging. See Joao-Pierre Ruth, Bloggers
Beware: The Boss Has You Bookmarked, NJBiz, Dec. 15, 2008,
http://www.njbiz.com/article.asp?aid=76834 ("[E]mployees are in for a rude awakening if
they assume online activities are completely protected by First Amendment rights." (quoting
Lewis Maltby, president of the National Workrights Institute in Princeton, New Jersey)).
Moreover, these employees do not magically gain First Amendment protection as citizens
once they leave work and blog about work-related matters. Blogging is just another form of
off-duty conduct that may harm the reputation of the company and over which an employer
may discipline an employee. See id.
3 See George Rutherglen, State Action, Private Action, and the Thirteenth Amendment,
94 VA. L. REv. 1367, 1370 (2008) ("All the ... provisions of the Constitution regulate the
structure and function of government, and if they confer individual rights, they protect only
against 'state action,' in the broad sense of action by the federal government as well as by
the states.").
4 See Eugene Volokh, Intermediate Questions of Religious Exemptions-A Research
Agenda with Test Suites, 21 CARDOZO L. REv. 595, 635 (1999) ("Under free speech law, the
government acting as employer has far more authority to restrict people's speech than does
the government acting as sovereign.").
5 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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especially when the public employee blogging is off-duty and the blog post
does not concern work-related matters.6
Describing the legal protection for public employee bloggers is an
important exercise, as many employers have ratcheted up their efforts to
limit or ban employee blogging while employees have simultaneously
increased blogging activity.7 It is not surprising that a new term has been
coined to uniquely denote the act of being fired for blogging about one's
employer: "Dooced."8 So the specific question that this Essay addresses is:
Do dooced employees have any First Amendment protection in the
workplace? But the larger issue examined by implication, and the one
addressed by this Symposium, is the continuing impact of technology on
First Amendment free speech rights at the beginning of the twenty-first
century.
This contribution to the Symposium proceeds in three parts. Part II
examines the predicament of private-sector employees who choose to blog
about their workplaces. Part III then lays out the potential First
Amendment free speech implications for public employees who engage in
the same types of activities. Finally, Part IV briefly considers a potential
6 See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80 (2004) (per curiam) ("[W]hen
government employees speak or write on their own time on topics unrelated to their
employment, the speech can have First Amendment protection, absent some governmental
justification 'far stronger than mere speculation' in regulating it." (quoting United States v.
Nat'l Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), 513 U.S. 454, 465, 475 (1995))); Paul M.
Secunda, Whither the Pickering Rights of Federal Employees, 79 U. COLO. L. REv. 1101,
1108 (2008) ("The only thing that is apparently clear concerning the job-relatedness of
speech is that public employee speech that occurs off-duty and is not work-related.., does
not come under the Pickering framework at all. Rather, under the NTEU line of cases, it is
protected much like normal citizen speech." (footnotes omitted)).
7 Recent studies suggest that one's work experience remains a popular blogging topic.
See Richard A. Paul & Lisa Hird Chung, Brave New Cyberworld." The Employer's Legal
Guide to the Interactive Internet, 24 LAB. LAW. 109, 111 (2008) ("Employees are avid [blog]
users. In an August 2005 survey, blog entries using the terms 'my job,' 'my work,' and 'my
boss' far outnumbered those on the topics of food, sex, sports, and dating." (citing EDELMAN
AND INTELLISEEK, TALKING FROM THE INSIDE OuT: THE RISE OF EMPLOYEE BLOGGERS 7
(2005), https://www.edehman.com/imageinsights/content/Edelman-Inteiseek%/2-Employee%2
Blogging0/o20White/20Paper.pd0)).
8 See Dooce.com, About, http://dooce.com/about ("Never write about work on the
internet unless your boss knows and sanctions the fact that YOU ARE WRITING ABOUT
WORK ON THE INTERNET. If you are the boss, however, you should be aware that when
you order Prada online and then talk about it out loud that you are making it very hard for
those around you to take you seriously.").
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future trend in Kentucky involving government employers banning
employee access to all blogs while at work.
II. BLOGGING WHILE PRIVATELY EMPLOYED
In the early years of the technology boom in this country, employers
became aware that it was vital to maintain tight control over their
technological resources. Many management-side employment law
associates over the years have been asked, as part of employee manuals
developed for employer-clients, to add a section on personal use of
telephones, computers, e-mail, and the Internet. Recognizing that the tort of
invasion of privacy requires an intrusion to be "highly offensive to a
reasonable person,"9 such policies make very clear that private-sector, at-
will employees have no legitimate expectation of privacy in their phone
calls, e-mails, and Internet activities.' ° To make doubly sure, employers
commonly attach acknowledgement forms to their employee manuals to
ensure that employees read these policies and cannot claim that they were
unaware of them in a subsequent termination lawsuit."
About three to five years ago, these same workplace technology
policies began expanding to cover the growing blogging phenomenon.1
2
More workers were blogging on their home and work computers about
work. Employers became increasingly concerned that proprietary,
confidential information was making its way to competitors and the public
through cyberspace.' 3 There was also the concern that instead of taking
9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977) ("One who intentionally intrudes,
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or
concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would
be highly offensive to a reasonable person.").
10 See Anna Bahney, Interns? No Bloggers Need Apply, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2006,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/25/fashion/thursdaystyles/25intern.html?scp=
1&sq=%22no%20bloggers%20need%20apply/o22&st-=cse ("While there are differences in
laws among jurisdictions, from a legal perspective . . . it is generally accepted that
companies have the right to impose controls on their employees' use of computers and other
equipment used for communication." (quoting Alfred C. Frawley, III, director of the
intellectual property practice group at the law firm Preti Flaherty in Portland, Maine)).
1 Such acknowledgment forms also usually require employees to indicate they have
read a thorough at-will disclaimer concerning the status of their employment.
12 EMarketer estimates that in 2007 there were 22.6 million United States bloggers. See
Technorati: State of the Blogosphere 2008 (Aug. 21, 2009), http://technorati.com/blogging/
article/state-of-the-blogosphere-introduction/.
13 One article categorizes employers' concerns about employees blogging this way: (1)
revealing confidential information; (2) utilizing, in an unauthorized manner, company logo
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naps or talking to friends and family on the phone, the newest way to
decrease productivity at work was surfing the Web, blogging on one's own
site, or commenting on other people's blogs. Finally, workers' sarcastic
and nastier sides would come out on the blogs, sometimes producing blog
posts attacking their employers and co-employees. 14
As a result, many more employers in this country have now added
specific blogging policies that apply to workers' blogging activities. 5 At
Cisco Systems, Inc., for instance, employees must identify themselves if
they are commenting on matters related to company activities and must also
state that they are describing their own personal opinions, rather than
speaking for the company.16 Interestingly, this last measure tracks with
what attorneys have been appending for years to their e-mail and fax
correspondences. There is also evidence from case law that private-sector
employees have been discharged for using their own computers at home for
writing something unpleasant about their employer or otherwise acting in a
manner disloyal to their employer's best interests. 7
or copyrighted material; (3) creating a discriminatory, harassing, or defamatory workplace
environment; (4) using violent remarks, threats, or intimidation against company officials or
co-employees; and (5) engaging in expression that is disloyal or insubordinate. See Paul &
Chung, supra note 7, at 118-21.
14 Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, First Amendment Protections Afforded to Blogs and
Bloggers, 35 A.L.R. 6TH 407, 416 (2008) ("Because the tone of blogs is often irreverent or
sarcastic, a successful blog, together with the readers' postings will, as a matter of routine,
severely criticize or ridicule named individuals or institutions.").
1" Bahney, supra note 10 ("[Pirodded by their legal and public relations departments,
[employers] are starting to adopt policies that address [blogging by employees]."); see also Martha
Neil, Bosses Are Making New Rules About Worker Blogging, ABA J., Dec. 15, 2008,
http/Avww.abajoumal.com/news/bosses_making_new rules_about_worker-blogging/ ("Concerned
about employee blogging that may have an adverse effect on the companies they work for, many
bosses are imposing new rules restricting such activities.").
16 Neil, supra note 15 (citing Ruth, supra note 2); see also Bahney, supra note 10
("Viacom, the parent company of Comedy Central, now has an explicit policy. In a section
on confidentiality, it states that the employee is 'discouraged from publicly discussing work-
related matters, whether constituting confidential information or not, outside of appropriate
work channels, including online in chat rooms or "blogs."').
17 Robert Sprague has cataloged a number of examples of bloggers being fired for work
commentary that received public attention. See Robert Sprague, Fired for Blogging: Are
There Legal Protections for Employees Who Blog?, 9 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 355, 357-58 (2007).
Other anecdotal evidence suggests that employers sometimes overreact to activities of
blogging employees. See Tracie Watson & Elisabeth Piro, Note, Bloggers Beware: A
Cautionary Tale of Blogging and the Doctrine of At-Will Employment, 24 HOFSTRA LAB. &
EMP. L.J. 333, 334 (2007) ("Bloggers such as Joyce Park, a former employee of Friendster,
have been fired for such minor infractions as posting already public information on their
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In any event, private-sector employees are facing more limits on what
they can blog about, when they can blog, and where they can blog.18 Much
to the surprise of many private-sector employee bloggers,' 9 the lack of state
action in these instances means that the First Amendment does not provide
any free speech protection.20 Instead, employees facing employer discipline
or discharge for their blogging activities have been forced to consider other
creative legal arguments in this employment at-will world. 1
For instance, I and others have proposed that bloggers writing about
common workplace issues may be engaged in protected, concerted activity
under section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).22 Under the
NLRA, employees are free to engage in concerted activities in the
workplace for their mutual aid and protection.2 3 A recent decision from the
personal blogs.").
18 The Employment Law Alliance survey, conducted through a telephone survey of
1000 adults in 2006, found that "of the workers whose companies have blogging policies, 62
percent say the policy prohibits posting any employer-related information and 60 percent say
the policy discourages employees from criticizing or making negative comments about the
company." See Posting of Paul M. Secunda to Workplace Prof Blog,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof blog/2006/02/employee blogge.html (Feb. 8,
2006, 7:54 EST).
19 RICHARD A. BALES, JEFFREY M. HIRSCH & PAUL M. SECUNDA, UNDERSTANDING
EMPLOYMENT LAw 83 (2007) ("One of the most common misconceptions in employment
law is that all workers enjoy First Amendment constitutional protections for their speech in
the workplace. They do not.").
20 See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976) ("It is, of course, a commonplace
that the constitutional guarantee of free speech is a guarantee only against abridgment by
government, federal or state. Thus, while statutory or common law may in some situations
extend protection or provide redress against a private corporation or person who seeks to
abridge the free expression of others, no such protection or redress is provided by the
Constitution itself." (citation omitted)).
21 See Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2155 (2008) ("The basic
principle of at-will employment is that an employee may be terminated for a 'good reason,
bad reason, or no reason at all."' (quoting Reply Brief of Petitioner at 27, Engquist v. Or.
Dep't of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146 (2008) (No. 07-474))); see also Sprague, supra note 17, at
355 ("While individuals may believe that they have the right to say what they want to on
their own time while using their own resources, the employment-at-will doctrine remains a
powerful tool for employers to discharge their employees without legal backlash.").
22 See Katherine M. Scott, When Is Employee Blogging Protected by Section 7 of the
NLRA?, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 17 (2006); Marc Cote, Comment, Getting Dooced:
Employee Blogs and Employer Blogging Policies Under the National Labor Relations Act,
82 WASH. L. REV. 121 (2007); Posting of Paul M. Secunda, Workplace Prof Blog,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof blog/2006/02/blogging and se.htm (Feb. 19,
2006).
23 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
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National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in Guard Publishing Co. might
put the kibosh on any such argument.2 4 Guard Publishing Co. found that
employees have no section 7 rights to use their employers' computers for
organizing purposes. 25 Consequently, it may be difficult for an employee-
blogger to claim NLRA protection for discussing workplace issues with
fellow employees on company computers. Nevertheless, this same
reasoning leads to a conclusion that employee blogging about the
workplace on a home computer might be protected. It will, of course, take
further adjudications by the NLRB to sort out all of these issues, and Guard
Publishing Co. might not stand long as precedent with the arrival of the
Obama NLRB.
Other legal approaches have had little success in protecting private-
sector employee bloggers. Some states have passed off-duty conduct
statutes, which generally prohibit employers from terminating employees
for engaging in lawful conduct outside of the workplace.26 For instance, the
Colorado lifestyle discrimination statute protects employees engaging in
lawful activity while away from work.27 However, such statutes generally
have limitations. For instance, the Colorado statute permits employers to
base adverse employment action on lawful off-duty conduct if such conduct
"[r]elates to a bona fide occupational requirement or is reasonably and
rationally related to the employment activities and responsibilities of a
particular employee," or would result in the employee having a conflict of
24 Guard Publ'g Co., 351 N.L.R.B. 1110 (2007).
2 Id. at 1116 ("[W]e find no basis in this case to refrain from applying the settled
principle that, absent discrimination, employees have no statutory right to use an employer's
equipment or media for Section 7 communications.").
26 States with broad off-duty conduct statutes include Colorado, North Dakota,
California, and New York. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 96(k) (West 2003); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 24-34-402.5(1) (2008); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(2) (McKinney 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 14-02.4-01 to -03 (2004). Additionally, a Connecticut statute protects employees, both
on-duty and off-duty, from suffering adverse employment decisions for engaging in First
Amendment-type activities. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51q (2003). Although the
Connecticut law, in particular, may seem like a panacea for all that ails private-sector
employee bloggers, "the Supreme Court of Connecticut cautioned in Daley v. Aetna Life and
Casualty Company [734 A.2d 112, 121 (Conn. 1999)], the First Amendment 'safeguard[s]
statements made by an employee that address a matter of public concern, but provide[s] no
security with respect to statements that address wholly personal matters."' Stephen D.
Lichtenstein & Jonathan J. Darrow, At-Will Employment: A Right to Blog or a Right to
Terminate?, 11 No. 9 J. INTERNET L. 1, 15 (2008) (second and third alterations by
Lichtenstein & Darrow).
27 COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1) (2008).
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interest.2 One can see how this language might preclude an employee
blogger writing about workplace issues from relying upon these statutes.29
Finally, fired private-sector employee bloggers have argued under
common law tort law theories for protection. They have been generally
unsuccessful under an invasion of privacy tort because, as explained above,
most employers make sure that employees have no expectations of privacy
when blogging at work; most blogs are open, so no expectation of privacy
exists.30  Similarly, torts for wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy have generally not panned out.31 In short, there are few protections
for private-sector workplace bloggers and even fewer First Amendment
implications.
III. BLOGGING WHILE PUBLICLY EMPLOYED
Because of the state action doctrine and the subsequent application of
the First Amendment, public employee bloggers find themselves in a
somewhat better situation than their private-sector counterparts. But it is
far from a perfect one.
Long ago, public employers worried about employees saying unkind
things about them in the press and media. Starting with Pickering v. Board
of Education32 forty years ago, which dealt with a public school teacher
writing about school budgetary issues in the local newspaper,33 the United
28 Id.
29 See Lichtenstein & Darrow, supra note 26, at 17 ("[W]hile the language of the [off-
duty conduct] statutes in these five states suggests broad protection for legal off-the-job
activities during non-working hours, judicial interpretation of the statutes has so far been
exceedingly narrow.").
30 Lichtenstein & Darrow, supra note 26, at 13 ("It is hard to imagine how an
employer's act of typing in a Web address and reading a publicly available blog could be
considered 'highly offensive."'); Sprague, supra note 17, at 363 ("[T]he typical blogger will
most likely not be able to claim invasion of privacy for the simple reason that most blogs are
open and available to anyone with Internet access.").
31 See BALES ET AL., supra note 19, at 89 (noting that courts have generally refused to
follow the approach of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Novosel v. Nationwide
Insurance Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983), and find that the First Amendment may not be
the source of public policy for a public policy tort claim). But see Wiegand v. Motiva
Enters., LLC, 295 F. Supp. 2d 465 (D. N.J. 2003) (finding that the federal Constitution,
including the First Amendment, could be a source of public policy tort, but finding against
an employee because commercial hate speech is not protected under the First Amendment).
32 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
31 Id. at 565 -66.
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States Supreme Court has sought to define, with mixed success, what
speech rights public employees have. On the one hand, the Court wished to
protect these individuals as citizens and recognized that many times these
workers held a working knowledge of the inside of government.34 On the
other hand, the Court realized that even government employers have to be
able to run their workplaces efficiently and provide their stated services to
the general public.35 Not surprisingly, the Pickering Court split the
difference by coming up with a balancing test. Under this balancing test, a
court weighs the First Amendment interests of the employee as a citizen
against the government interest in running an efficient government service
for the public. 36 If the balance under Pickering favors the employee, that
employee has First Amendment rights in the speech. So, although public
employees have First Amendment rights in the workplace, the rights are not
nearly as robust as what individuals enjoy as private citizens.37
Furthermore, the scope of the free speech right appears to be shrinking
for public employees. Since Pickering, the Court, in a number of decisions,
has set up what I have previously referred to as the "free speech five-
step. ''38 This same five-step process will determine, in most cases, whether
a blogging public employee can seek protections from employer discipline
for the employee's blogging activities.
34 Id. at 572 ("Teachers are, as a class, the members of a community most likely to have
informed and definite opinions as to how funds allotted to the operations of the schools
should be spent.").
35 The governmental interests concern maintaining "a significant degree of control over
their employees' words and actions" because "without it, there would be little chance for the
efficient provision of public services." Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418-19 (2006)
(citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983)).
36 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571-72. The balance undertaken in Pickering is required
because although the government employer performs important public functions and
consequently possesses far broader powers in its employer capacity than in its sovereign
capacity, nevertheless, "a citizen who works for the government is... a citizen." Garcetti,
547 U.S. at 419-20.
37 The exact scope of First Amendment protection for public employee bloggers is
uncertain because of the lack of litigation concerning blogging and its relationship to
blogging employees. See Neil, supra note 15.
38 Secunda, supra note 6, at 1107-11 (describing the free speech five-step for public
employees).
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In the first step of the process, which is based on the recent United
States Supreme Court case Garcetti v. Ceballos,39 a court first asks whether
the employee is speaking pursuant to official duties. 4° In Garcetti, a deputy
district attorney for Los Angeles County, Richard Ceballos, was subjected
to adverse employment actions for speaking out about an allegedly
defective search warrant in a criminal case.41 The question presented to the
Supreme Court was whether Ceballos had engaged in protected speech
under the First Amendment such that he could not be retaliated against for
his actions with regard to the search warrant.42 The Court held that if
employees are engaged in official duty speech at work, they are not
speaking as citizens and thus enjoy no First Amendment protection for their
speech.43 Therefore, Ceballos lost the case because it was determined that
his actions were pursuant to his official duties. The Court indicated in
making this determination that the test "is a practical one" and focuses on
"the duties an employee actually is expected to perform."
44
Now, even though most employees do not have the official duty of
blogging,45 many public employees fall into the trap of using their
workplace computers to engage in blogging activities that run afoul of their
employer or co-employees. Indeed, even some of the most well-intentioned
blogging, like research or other work-related purposes, might inadvertently
run afoul of Garcetti. Although litigation post-Garcetti is still in its nascent
39 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
40 Id. at 421 ("[W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to their official
duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the
Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.").
41 See id. at 413-15.
421d. at 415.
43 Id. at 424. Interestingly, this holding that government workers cannot act as
employees and citizens at the same time controverts a previous statement of the Court that a
teacher making a presentation before a board of education "spoke both as an employee and a
citizen exercising First Amendment rights." City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wis.
Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 176 n. 1 (1976).
44Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424-25.
45 In applying this first step to employees hired to blog, it might be difficult for them to
distinguish between their work-related blogging and their personal blogging, especially
when their personal blogging criticizes their employers. For an example of this problem in
the related case of where a public employee is hired as a spokesperson, but seeks to speak to
a newspaper on her own time, see generally the discussion of Chambers v. Dep't of the
Interior, 103 M.S.P.R. 375 (2006), in Paul M. Secunda, Garcetti's Impact on the First
Amendment Rights of Federal Employees, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REv. 117, 136-38 (2008).
688 UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE LA WREVIEW [Vol.47
stages,4 it appears that much of the litigation surrounding Garcetti will
focus on a practical assessment of the official duties of the public employee,
with employers seeking broad definitions and employees more narrow
ones.47 The Garcetti standard makes only one thing apparently clear: Off-
duty public employee speech that has no relation to work (anti-Garcetti
speech) does not come under the Pickering framework and is protected
much like normal citizen speech.48 Thus, public employee bloggers should
be safe blogging about non-work-related issues while away from work.49
Even if public employee bloggers can escape the Garcetti trap,
employees must show that their speech addresses a "matter of public
concern" because it is only this type of speech that is at the core of the First
Amendment's protections. Under Connick v. Myers,50 courts are directed to
look at the surrounding content, form, and context of the speech to
determine whether the speech involves a matter of public concern. 5' This
type of speech "typically [includes] matters concerning government policies
that are of interest to the public at large, a subject on which public
employees are uniquely qualified to comment. 52 Sometimes the analysis
turns on whether the speech addresses a "matter of political, social, or other
concern to the community, ' 53 or is worthy of legitimate news interest.54 If
it is determined that the public employee blogger is involved merely in
46 Only a few cases have been found that involve both the Garcetti standard and
blogging. See, e.g., Stengle v. Office of Dispute Resolution, 631 F. Supp. 2d 564 (M.D. Pa.
2009); Ranck v. Rundle, No. 08-22235-CIV, 2009 WL 1684645 (S.D. Fla. June 16,2009).
47 See, e.g., Morales v. Jones, 494 F.3d 590, 596 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Haynes v. City
of Circleville, 474 F.3d 357 (6th Cir. 2007)); Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp.,
474 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2007); Green v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 472 F.3d 794 (10th Cir.
2007); Battle v. Bd. of Regents, 468 F.3d 755 (1lth Cir. 2006); Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d
528 (9th Cir. 2006); Mills v. City of Evansville, 452 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 2006).
48 "[W]hen government employees speak or write on their own time on topics unrelated
to their employment, the speech can have First Amendment protection, absent some
governmental justification 'far stronger than mere speculation' in regulating it." City of San
Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80 (2004) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Nat'l Treasury
Employees Union (NTEU), 513 U.S. 454, 465, 475 (1995)).
49 One possible exception is if the employee becomes a blog addict and neglects his
full-time job. Such a scenario obviously may have repercussions for the employee at work.
50 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
5' Id. at 147-48.
52 City of San Diego, 543 U.S. at 80.
13 Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.
14 City of San Diego, 543 U.S. at 83-84. The Court itself has recognized, however, that
"the boundaries of the public concern test are not well defined." Id. at 83. Past cases, by
analogy, provide the best indication about whether speech is on a matter of public concern.
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speech of a purely private interest, like an employment dispute with
supervisors or co-employees, then there is no First Amendment protection
because such blogging does not implicate the core concerns of the First
Amendment."
The U.S. Supreme Court tipped its hand on how it might view this type
of blogging scenario in the case of City of San Diego v. Roe, 6 which
involved a public employee's off-duty use of eBay. More specifically, John
Roe was a police officer for the city of San Diego who lost his job when his
supervising sergeant discovered that, during his free time, John enjoyed
stripping off a police uniform, masturbating in front of a video camera, and
selling the resulting pornography on eBay. 57 In a per curiam decision, the
United States Supreme Court held that Roe was not denied his rights to free
expression under the First Amendment by the police department's actions,
as he was not expressing himself on a "matter of public concern.',
58
While not similar factually, the recent case Richerson v. Beckon,
59
which involves a public employee workplace blogger, is similar to City of
San Diego from an outcome perspective. In Richerson, the Central Kitsap
School District initially employed Tara Richerson as the Director of
Curriculum. 60  She then was in line for a voluntary transfer to a new
position that would permit her to work half time as a curriculum specialist
and half time with a new instructional coaching model.6' Importantly, the
instructional coach component of her prospective job required her to follow
a model which emphasized the sensitive and confidential relationship
between her coaching position and the teachers that she would be
62
mentoring.
Before Richerson was transferred, the school district became aware that
she was using a personal blog to be critical of her replacement in the
55 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 147.
16 543 U.S. at 78.
57Id. at 78-79.
58Id. at 84.
'9 No. C07-5590 JKA, 2008 WL 833076 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 27, 2008), aff'd, 337 F.
App'x 637 (9th Cir. 2009).
6°Id. at *1.
61 Id.
62 Id. Her blog was located online at http://whatitslikeontheinside.blogspot.com. It now
can be found at http://whatitslikeontheinside.com/index.html and contains the disclaimer:
"This is a personal blog. All opinions expressed here are my own and not those of my
employer, natch."
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director position.63  Since language is outcome-determinative in public
employee free speech cases, here is an excerpt of the July 13, 2006 blog
posting:
Save us, White Boy!
I met with the new me today: the person who will take my summer work
and make it a full-time year-round position. I was on the interview
committee for this job and this guy was my third choice.., and a reluctant
one at that. I truly hope that I have to eat my words about this guy....
But after spending time with this guy today, I think Boss Lady 2.0 made
the wrong call in hiring him .... He comes across as a smug know-it-all
creep. And that's probably the nicest way I can describe him.... He has a
reputation of crapping on secretaries and not being able to finish tasks on
his own.... And he's white. And male. I know he can't help that, but I
think the district would have done well to recruit someone who has other
connections to the community. . . .Mighty White Boy looks like he's
going to crash and bum.
64
Although the school district did not terminate Richerson for this
conduct, she was officially reprimanded for violating the professional
standards associated with the interview process.65 Richerson, however, did
not appear to learn her lesson and later commented about a co-employee
and chief union negotiator on her blog: "What I wouldn't give to draw a
little Hitler mustache on the chief negotiator., 66  After receiving a
complaint from this co-employee, the district involuntarily reassigned
Richerson to the position of classroom teacher, though they did not ask her
to stop blogging.67
Based on this record, the court granted summary judgment to the school
district on the claim that Richerson's blogging deserved First Amendment
protection. Specifically, the court found that the language did not qualify as
speech on a matter of public concern under Connick.68 Thus, although there
is not much litigation in this area yet, the combination of City of San Diego





6 8 Id. at *4. The court noted that not only did the first blog posting represent a breach of
confidentiality, but "it was racist, sexist, and bordered on vulgar," and it was inconsistent
with the types of public concern issues contemplated by the Pickering line of cases. Id.
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and Richerson suggests that public employee bloggers might have the
hardest time finding First Amendment speech protection under Connick's
public concern test, given the personal nature of many blog postings.
However, if Connick can be cleared, the third step the court undertakes
is the previously discussed Pickering balance of interests. Case law over
the years has shown that the balancing usually is resolved based on whether
the public employee's expression causes a substantial disruption in the
workplace.69 Substantial disruption, in turn, is measured based on such
things as "the impact of the speech on working relationships, the harm
caused by the speech, the public's interest in the speech, and the employee's
relationship to that issue., 70  Paradoxically, this substantial-disruption
standard appears to constitutionalize the heckler's veto and makes most
vulnerable that speech which is the most unpopular and warrants the most
protection under the First Amendment.7 ' In other words, it may be the
controversial blogger who finds it hardest to obtain protection under this
prong of the free speech framework. Another way to think of this is that if
the blogger's activities were not causing some significant ripples in the
workplace, it is unlikely that the employer would be concerned.
Applying this balance to the Richerson case, it appears clear that the
school district would have won the balancing of interests. Although the
court did not expressly base its decision on Pickering, there is language in
other parts of the opinion that implies that the district's interest in efficiency
would have outweighed Richerson's First Amendment concerns. More
specifically, Richerson was causing a substantial disruption in the
workplace and the school district had the right to foster a harmonious
working environment. Certainly, given her penchant for gossip, it does not
seem that the school district should have been forced to tolerate her as a
72
mentor in an instructional program that requires trust and sensitivity.
It is probably, by now, more than apparent to the reader how difficult it
is for public employees to negotiate this framework, but if the Pickering
69 See Randy J. Kozel, Reconceptualizing Public Employee Speech, 99 Nw. U. L. REV.
1007, 1018 (2005).
70 Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, Public Employee Speech Rights Fall Prey to an
Emerging Doctrinal Formalism, 15 WM. & MARY BiLL RTs. J. 1173, 1177 (2007).
71 Kozel, supra note 69, at 1019.72 Richerson, 2008 WL 833076, at *3 ("[T]he concern of the defendant was prospective,
i.e.[,] that plaintiffs self proclaimed role as a personality reporter of school personnel would
affect her ability to maintain the code above set forth for mentoring fellow teachers with
trust and confidence.").
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balance favors the employee, the employee is then considered to have
engaged in protected speech. The fourth step requires application of the
evidentiary framework established in Mount Healthy City School District v.
Doyle.73  Under this framework, the plaintiff must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that engaging in the protected speech was a
substantial or motivating factor for the adverse employment action the
employee suffered.74 This step seems less important in the public employee
blogging context because it is usually the employees' expression which gets
them into hot water in the first place.
The fifth and final step of this Byzantine framework requires the
government to prove that it would have made the same decision even in the
absence of the protected employee speech.75 If the public employer is
successful in meeting this burden, there is no liability. This is because
"[t]he constitutional principle at stake is sufficiently vindicated if such an
employee is placed in no worse a position than if he had not engaged in the
conduct., 76 Only if the employee can survive this fifth and last obstacle
may liability be imposed against the public employer and the responsible
agents of the employer.77 In the case of someone like Richerson, the school
district might have been able to point to other objectionable conduct by her
and assert that it would have made the same decision regardless of her
blogging activities. In other words, if the employee is a general malcontent,
this step might prove another way to avert liability for the employer.
In all, public employees do have some First Amendment protection in
their blogging activities, but the more job-related the blog content and the
more this content causes disruptions at the workplace, the less likely the
employee will receive constitutional protection. Given the complexity of
the Pickering analysis, public employees may only expect real
constitutional protection when blogging if they blog on their personal
computers outside of work and in no way related to their work. This is not
7' 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
74 Id. at 287.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 285-86.
77 However, even if public employees meet all five steps, state employers may be able
to avail themselves of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Moreover,
responsible agents of the employers may be able to avoid individual liability if they show
they are eligible for qualified immunity, though they still might be subject to injunctive
relief. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 8.6.3, at 528-29 (4th ed. 2003).
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exactly the robust constitutional protection that many of these bloggers
believe they have.
IV. A FUTURE TREND FROM KENTUCKY?: LIMITING PUBLIC EMPLOYEES'
ACCESS TO BLOGS
Because of the lack of precedent in this area, there are still many issues
that need to be resolved. One of the more important ones involves
employee access to technology in the public workplace in the Bluegrass
State. The disagreement stems from a dispute over whether a government
employer may completely ban its employees from accessing all blogs
during work time, while allowing access to other websites on the Internet.78
In Nickolas v. Fletcher,79 former Republican Governor Ernie Fletcher
of Kentucky directed the state to promulgate a policy which prohibited state
employees from accessing blogs from state-owned computers.80 Initially,
the ban only applied to chat rooms and pornographic sites, but it was later
expanded to blogs and other categories of Web content after a state study
concluded that state employees were wasting too much time at work
accessing blogs. 8' This policy was subsequently challenged by a non-
employee blogger, Mark Nickolas, whose blog focused on Kentucky state
politics and was critical of Governor Fletcher's administration.82 His blog
was included in the ban, and he challenged the policy under the First
Amendment and Equal Protection Clause, alleging that the ban was due in
part to the viewpoints he represented on his blog.
83
The federal district court ruled against the state's motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, finding that the blogger's allegations, if taken as
true, that the state prohibited employees from accessing his blog because of
his viewpoints expressed, would violate the First Amendment. 84 It appears
78 See Government Employee Rights to Access Blogs at Work, Workplace Prof Blog,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof blog/2006/06/govermment-empl.html (June 22,
2006) [hereinafter Government Employee Blog].79 No. 3:06-CV-00043, 2007 WL 1035012 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 30, 2007).
8 0 Id. at *1.
8" See id.
82 Id. It was alleged initially that it was the criticisms of the blogger on his site,
BlueGrassReport.com, which caused the ban of his website. It was only later that the ban
was expanded to all blogs (probably to avoid charges of viewpoint discrimination). See
Government Employee Blog, supra note 78.83 Nickolas, 2007 WL 1035012, at *1.
84 Id. at *3-*4.
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that a state employee could have made the same claim if the employee was
not able to access a blog because of the viewpoints of its authors.
Interestingly, no public employee seems to have challenged the policy as of
yet. Nevertheless, although a public employee's blog is not involved, the
ability of public employees to access blogs is involved. First Amendment
rights of public employees are therefore involved here because it is not just
the speech of the speaker that is protected, but it is the right of the listener
to obtain information that is also implicated.85
The court ruled, however, against the blogger's request for preliminary
injunctive relief based on its conclusion that the plaintiffs claim did not
have "a strong likelihood of success on the merits."86  The court first
pointed out that because a public employee did not bring a claim, the
Pickering analysis was not applicable.8 7 Rather, the court argued that a
forum analysis should apply where the government is limiting the use of its
website.88  Undertaking this complicated forum analysis, the court
concluded that the Internet on state computers is a nonpublic forum.89
Moreover, the court concluded that the state's ban on blogs was consistent
with the purpose of a nonpublic forum in that the state's policy was not
unreasonable in light of the state's interest and appeared to be viewpoint-
neutral.90 On the last point, the court pointed to evidence which suggested
85 See Laurent Sacharoff, Listener Interests in Compelled Speech Cases, 44 CAL. W. L.
REV. 329, 383 (2008) ("The Court... makes clear that listener interests alone can justify a
free speech right for listeners, even in cases in which the speakers do not enjoy a free speech
right.").86 Nickolas, 2007 WL 1035012, at *9.
81 Id. at *4.
88 Id.
89 Id. at *5 (citing Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville, 221 F.3d 834 (6th Cir. 2000)).
90 Id. at *7-*9. This is really the crux of the case: Whether the state was primarily
motivated in blocking access to blogs in order to impede Nickolas's blog, and other blogs,
that were critical of it. The timing seems awfully suspicious and there does not appear to be
a good reason to distinguish between blogs and other news sites, though the state claims that
blogs were one of the types of websites most visited by state employees during work hours.
Id. at *7. The district court agreed with the state that the access to other mainstream news
sites was reasonable in that it was only permitted if "incidental" and did not interfere with
government business. Id. at *7. It is not clear, however, how the state is keeping track of
whether state employee use of news websites is more than incidental or how "incidental" is
measured. This purported standard is also confused by the fact that many state employees
appear to use mainstream news sites to conduct state business. Id. at *8. Finally, it is not
clear why blogs with news content could not be utilized for similar, state business-related
purposes.
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that the blog ban was based on objective evidence that blogs were one of
the types of websites upon which state employees were wasting time and
undermining the efficiency of the public service. The court also credited
government evidence that the policy was not adopted on a viewpoint-
discriminatory basis, strong counter-evidence presented by Nickolas to the
contrary notwithstanding.9
The Nickolas case is interesting on a number of levels. Although the
case was eventually settled favorably for the plaintiff, and Kentucky's state
policy no longer blocks access to blogs,92 the case raises the issue of
whether other government employers will seek to ban or otherwise limit
blog use at government workplaces. For example, under the Kentucky
settlement agreement, state employees are still prohibited "from posting on
... blogs on their state owned computers." 93 There is also the question of
whether the Internet on state computers is indeed a nonpublic forum,
subject to a less stringent First Amendment analysis. Finally, and most
significant for purposes of this Essay, the question remains: What would
happen if a public employee did challenge the Kentucky ban?
Applying the Pickering analysis to the facts of this case, I do not
foresee either Garcetti or Connick being an issue. The case would appear to
come down to a balancing of public employee First Amendment interests
against the efficiency interests of the state government. Although the
outcome is far from clear, an employee's success appears to hinge on a
showing that Nickolas's blog does not cause a substantial disruption to state
91 Id. at *9. I tend to disagree with the court on this point and think that it is more likely
that the policy had its genesis in viewpoint discrimination, given its timing, and that the
normal procedures for promulgating such a policy do not seem to have been followed. Id. at
*8 ("Nickolas claims that the normal procedures regarding a change in the computer systems
were not followed when the State adopted its new Internet policy. Furthermore, as evidence
that the State's policy specifically targeted him, Nickolas states that the ban on blogs was
implemented the same day that he was quoted in the New York Times article criticizing the
Governor and his administration." (citations omitted)).
92 The case was favorably settled for the plaintiff on June 17, 2008, after new
Democratic Governor Steve Brashear replaced Governor Fletcher on December 11, 2007.
See Settlement Agreement in Nickolas v. Brashear (June 17, 2008), available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/NickolasSettlement.pdf. Under the state's new Internet
policy, "the category 'newsgroups/blogs' is no longer blocked by the internet filtering
software." Id. at 6. Nevertheless, the state has retained the discretion to "block access to
'blogs' if pursuant to a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral standard that applies equally to all
websites." Id. at 7.
93Id. at 6.
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business. Such a showing may be able to be made by arguing that one blog
is unlikely to cause much of an upheaval in such a large bureaucracy.
Alternatively, an employee could argue that state employees should be able
to utilize his blog just like other mainstream news websites to help conduct
state business and set state policy. In short, I am cautiously optimistic that
a public employee challenge might be successful if someday maintained.
V. CONCLUSION
Public employee bloggers may have First Amendment protections for
their blogging activities under current constitutional law doctrine. Such
protection is not as robust as that enjoyed by private citizens, but the
protection may be enjoyed under limited circumstances. To the extent that
public employees wish to take advantage of more blogging technology in
the future, both at work and away from work, constitutional doctrine in this
area must be modified to recognize the important roles that public
employees play in maintaining the transparency and accountability of
government for all of us.
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